We first give a coarse-grained modal-logical analysis of the four best known second-order false-belief tasks. This preliminary analysis shows that the four tasks share a common logical structure in which a crucial role is played by a "principle of inertia" which says that an agent's belief is preserved over time unless the agent gets information to the contrary. It also reveals informational symmetries (all four possibilities inherent in the two dimensions of deception versus no-deception and change-in-world versus change-in-belief-only are realized) and reveals a rather puzzling feature common to all four tasks. We then take a closer look at how the principle of inertia is used, which leads to a fine-grained analysis in terms of perspective shifting. We formalize this analysis using a natural deduction system for hybrid logic, and show that the proof modelling the solution to the first-order Sally-Anne task is nested inside the proof modelling the second-order solution.
Introduction
In this paper we use modal and hybrid logic to analyse four second-order false-belief tasks. We begin with our running example, the second-order Sally-Anne task (which was introduced in [ 
3]):
A child is shown a scene with two doll protagonists, Sally and Anne, with a basket and a box respectively. Sally first places a marble into her basket. Then Sally leaves the scene, and in her absence, Anne moves the marble and puts it in her box. However, although Anne does not realise this, Sally is peeking through the keyhole and sees what Anne is doing. Then Sally returns, and the child is asked: "Where does Anne think that [Sally will] look for her marble?"
Experiments have shown that typically developing children above the age of six usually handle second-order tasks correctly; see [13, 14] . They answer that Anne thinks that Sally will look in the basket, which is where Anne (falsely) believes that Sally believes the marble to be. Younger children usually answer that Anne thinks that Sally will look in the box: this is indeed where Sally knows the marble to be, but Anne does not know that Sally knows this, and hence the response is incorrect. In short, to pass the test, the experimental subject must ascribe a false belief to Anne, thus ensuring that the answer can't be explained as the subject simply reporting what is true -it really is Anne's belief that is being reported. For children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), the shift to correct responses tends to occur at a later age, if it happens at all.
If the bold font material is deleted, and [Sally will] is switched to 'will Sally', our statement of the second-order Sally-Anne task becomes a statement of the well known first-order Sally-Anne task (it was introduced in [2]):
Anne task. In Section 6 we extend this to a formalization of the second-order task; as we shall see, the proof modelling the first-order solution is nested inside the proof modelling the second-order solution. In Section 7 we conclude.
Logic and false-belief tasks
Frege and Husserl both tried to divorce logic and psychology, but post-1945 work in cognitive science and artificial intelligence put logic-based models of cognitive abilities back on the agenda, and the 2008 publication of Stenning and Van Lambalgen [19] brought logic and psychology even closer. This pioneering work considers a wide range of psychological tasks, including the first-order Sally-Anne tasks, which it analyses using non-monotonic closed-world reasoning. Stenning and Van Lambalgen make use of the principle of inertia, and draw a useful distinction between belief formation and belief manipulation, which we will adopt in our discussion below. The first-order Sally-Anne task has also been formalized using an interactive theorem prover for a many-sorted first-order modal logic, an approach which also makes use of the principle of inertia; see [1] . But we know of few examples of logical modelling of second-order false-belief tasks: the clearest is the Dynamic Epistemic Logic based analysis given in [4] , though the use of game theory in [21] to investigate performance in higher-order social reasoning, for instance, is also relevant. This paper builds on recent hybrid-logical work on false-beliefs [6, 7, 8] . The distinguishing feature of the hybrid-logical approach is that perspective shift is taken as fundamental. That is, it formalizes the local shifts of perspective required by the experimental subject when reasoning about the agents in the scenario (in our running example, Sally and Anne). The intuition is this: correctly handling the first-order Sally-Anne task seems to involve taking the perspective of Sally, and reasoning about what she believes. So to speak, you have to put yourself in Sally's shoes. As we shall argue below, correctly handling the second-order Sally-Anne task seems to involve taking the perspective of another agent, namely Anne, and reasoning about her perspective on Sally's belief: you have to put yourself in Anne's shoes while she is putting herself in Sally's shoes. In this paper we turn these shoes into nested natural deduction proofs.
A coarse-grained analysis
We now give a course-grained analysis of the four second-order tasks: we isolate the belief-states involved, and informally describe the reasoning leading from one belief-state to another. Three distinct times (t 0 , t 1 , and t 2 ) are significant in each story, 2 and in Table 2 in the Appendix we have described the belief-states at each of these times; the logical symbolism should be self-explanatory.
The reasoning pattern underlying all four tasks is clear. 3 First, note that in all four examples we make use of B¬ψ → ¬Bψ, the (contraposed form) of a modal principle called D: if we believe ψ to be false then we don't believe ψ. But in all four cases the crucial ingredient is the application of a "principle of inertia" saying that an agent's belief is preserved over time unless the agent has information to the contrary. For example, in the second-order Sally-Anne task, it is initially the case that Anne believes that Sally thinks that the marble is in the basket, formalized as B anne B sally basket(t 0 ). Initially it is also the case that Sally thinks that the marble is in the basket, B sally basket(t 0 ), but Sally's belief changes at the intermediate stage t 1 since she sees through the keyhole the marble being moved, so ¬B sally basket(t 2 ). Anne, however, does not know that Sally saw this, so Anne continues to believe that Sally thinks that the marble is in the basket, hence B anne B sally basket(t 2 ), the correct answer to the task.
This pattern underlies all four tasks: the correct answer is always a formula of the form B x B y φ whose truth is preserved from stage t 0 to stage t 2 , and subformula B y φ always becomes false at stage t 1 -unbeknownst to agent x, who ends up in t 2 with a false belief about the belief of agent y. So to derive the correct answer B x B y φ(t 2 ), the experimental subject must work out that agent x does not know that something led to a changed belief for agent y.
Zero-order, first-order and second-order information Let's dig a little deeper for commonalities and differences. Table 3 in the Appendix summarizes the potentially relevant information available in the tasks, not just the information used in the coarse-grained analysis.
We start with the Sally-Anne task, where B x B y φ(t 2 ) is instantiated to B anne B sally basket(t 2 ). Note that in Table 3 we have focused solely on the predicate occurring in the correct answer, namely basket, and ignored the predicate box . That is, we assume that what matters is whether or not Sally believes the marble has been moved from the basket, not where it has been moved to. With this restriction, rows 1-5 in Table 3 summarize the potentially relevant zero-order, first-order and second-order information in the Sally-Anne task.
Similarly, rows 6-10 in Table 3 summarize the information in the bake-sale task, where
. We have again focussed on the predicate occurring in the correct answer, which in this case is chocolate, so we are assuming that what matters is whether or not chocolate cookies are for sale, not what else is. We have also restricted our attention to Maria and Sam, the agents involved in the correct answer, and ignored Mom and the mailman, as their perspectives seem irrelevant.
In a similar fashion, rows 11-15 and 16-20 summarize the information available in the icecream and the puppy tasks. Here we also restrict attention to the predicate φ and the agents x and y involved in the correct answer B x B y φ(t 2 ). These restrictions enable us to compare the information in the various tasks in a uniform way, which we will now do. 4 Let's start by comparing second-order information. First, note that in the Sally-Anne case, there is an asymmetry in the agents' second-order information (see rows 4 and 5): from time t 1 on, Sally believes that Anne believes that the marble has been moved away from the basket, since Sally can see Anne moving the marble. But Anne is not aware of this (Anne is deceived). On the other hand, in the bake-sale case, the second-order information (rows 9 and 10) is symmetric: at all three times Maria believes that Sam believes they sell chocolate cookies, and Sam also believes that Maria believes they sell chocolate cookies (so there is no deception). 5 So second-order information in the bake-sale case is symmetric whereas in the Sally-Anne case it is not. Similarly, the ice-cream task is symmetric (rows 14 and 15), but the puppy task is not (rows 19 and 20).
Next, let's consider the zero-order information. In the Sally-Anne case we have basket(t 0 ), ¬basket(t 1 ), and ¬basket(t 2 ) (see row 1 of Table 3 ). So the formula B y φ becomes false at t 1 since both the world and the belief agent y has about the world change. On the other hand, in bake-sale we have ¬chocolate(t 0 ), ¬chocolate(t 1 ), and ¬chocolate(t 2 ) (see row 6). In this case, the falsification of B y φ at t 1 is not caused by a change in the world, but only by a change in the belief agent y has about the world. We shall say that there is a change-in-the-world in the Sally-Anne case, and a change-in-belief-only in the bake-sale case. Similarly, there is a change-in-the-world in the ice-cream task (row 11), but a change-in-belief-only in the puppy task (row 16). Table 3 sums up the zero-order and the second-order informational differences between the tasks. It shows that the bake-sale and (second-order) Sally-Anne tasks are maximally different -they differ both at zero-order and second-order levels -as are the ice-cream and the puppy stories. Analyzing the first-order information reveals something curious. First, observe that in all four tasks we have B x ¬φ(t 2 ). So at the last stage t 2 of each story, agent x believes -indeed knows -that φ is false. For example, in the Sally-Anne case, Anne knows that the marble is not in the basket (as she has moved it), and in the bake-sale case, Maria knows that no chocolate cookies are for sale. But in all four tasks we also have B x B y φ(t 2 ).
That is: in all four tasks there are false beliefs in two layers: there is the outer layer where the experimental subject has to ascribe a false belief to agent x, but there is also an inner layer where agent x ascribes a belief in a proposition to agent y, but agent x knows that this proposition is false. To put it another way: what we might call inner first-order deception is built into all four tasks. Note that this is different from the overt second-order deception present in the Sally-Anne and Puppy tasks: second-order deception plays a clear role in their experimental designs. But this inner first-order deception does not seem to be a part of the experimental design of the four second-order false belief tasks: B x ¬φ(t 2 ) is not used to derive the correct answers. 6 Nonetheless, it seems hard to devise second-order scenarios which don't have inner first-order deception built into them without the experimental design falling apart. But as far as we are aware, the general presence of this kind of 'deception' is not something that has been noted or discussed in the literature on second-order false-beliefs.
A fine-grained analysis
We now make the coarse-grained analysis fine-grained by examining the role of the principle of inertia in more detail. Consider how it is used in the first-order Sally-Anne task. There the child (who we will call Peter) is asked: Where will Sally look for her marble? The inertia principle is clearly involved in Peter's reasoning: he takes it for granted that it can be applied to Sally's understanding. Indeed, learning to take it for granted in such circumstances is part of what is meant by acquiring first-order false-belief competence.
In the second-order case, Peter is asked: Where does Anne think Sally will look for her marble? Now, this is a question about Anne, thus it might seem that the key reasoning step for Peter is (once again) to take for granted that inertia applies, this time to Anne's understanding. After all, Anne never leaves the room, so she is right in front of that marble all the time, so inertia seems relevant. And as Peter observes, Anne does not "receive information to the contrary" (because she does not see Sally peek) and so the inertia principle applies and Anne's belief about Sally's belief will be preserved from t 0 to t 2 .
But this analysis does not go deep enough. How does Peter "observe" that Anne does not "receive information to the contrary"? He certainly observes that Anne does not see Sally peekbut what links this observation with Anne's beliefs? There is a gap here. Peter cannot simply apply the principle of inertia to Anne's understanding; rather, he must understand that Anne is applying inertia to Sally's understanding. Anne reasons that Sally will preserve her belief in the marble being in the basket, because Anne believes that Sally does not see the marble being moved. This belief fills the missing gap-it builds a logical "bridge" to Peter's observation.
Summing up, in the fine-grained analysis the principle of inertia is applied by Anne to Sally's belief (and not by Peter to Anne's belief). And this has an interesting consequence. It means that Anne is playing the same role in the second-order Sally-Anne task (namely, reasoning about Sally's belief) that Peter played in the first-order task. And this suggests a road to formalization: take a proof that formalizes the first-order task (Peter's reasoning about Sally) and view it instead as formalizing Anne's reasoning about Sally. Nest this proof (at the appropriate place) inside a formalization of Peter's reasoning about the second-order task; this will fill in the missing details about Anne's use of the inertia principle. This is the goal of the following two sections, where we will use natural deduction in hybrid logic to formalize the perspectival reasoning involved.
Formalizing the first-order Sally-Anne task
First we define the syntax and semantics of the fragment of hybrid logic we use for the formalization of the first-order Sally-Anne task, namely a version of Seligman's [18] Logic of Correct Description (LCD). We assume we are given a set of propositional symbols (to be thought of as placeholders for information that is seen, believed, deduced . . . , and so on) and a set of nominals (to be thought of as names of the agents in the scenarios: Sally and Anne in our running example). We assume these sets are disjoint. We use p, q, r, . . . , for ordinary propositional symbols and s, a, b, c, . . . , for nominals.
Definition 5.1 Formulas of LCD are defined by the following grammar:
Negation is defined by the convention that ¬φ is an abbreviation for φ → ⊥.
1. W is a non-empty set; think of these as the agents in the scenario of interest.
2. For each w, V w is a function that to each ordinary propositional symbol assigns an element of {0, 1}.
Given a model M = (W, {V w } w∈W ), an assignment is a function g that to each nominal assigns an element of W . The relation M, g, w |= φ, where g is an assignment, w is an element of W , and φ is a formula, is defined as follows:
Two remarks. First, nominals should be thought of as naming the unique agent they are true at. For example, we shall use s as a nominal true at Sally; in effect it is a 'name' or 'constant' that picks her out. 7 But nominals are also used to make modalities: if φ is an arbitrary formula and s is the nominal that names Sally, then a new formula @ s φ can be built. The @ s prefix is called a satisfaction operator and the formula @ s φ is called a satisfaction statement. Satisfaction statements let us switch perspectives: if we evaluate the satisfaction statement @ s φ at any agent in a model, it will be true iff φ is true at Sally.
Second, note that we have not introduced any modalities apart from the satisfaction operators. But this is not an oversight. In what follows the reader will encounter expressions of the form @ s Sφ (that is, Sally sees φ) and @ s Bφ (that is, Sally believes φ). But as far as the analysis of 
. . , φ n and ψ are satisfaction statements, and there are no undischarged assumptions in the derivation of ψ besides the specified occurrences of φ 1 , . . . , φ n and c. † The nominal c does not occur in ψ or in any undischarged assumptions other than the specified occurrences of c.
first-order false-belief tasks is concerned, expressions containing the modalities S and B are not used in genuinely modal reasoning. Indeed, expressions of the form Sφ and Bφ are essentially complicated-looking propositional symbols: they are only used in simple propositional reasoning and then fed (once) into a perspective-shifting natural-deduction rule called Term. This will change (at least for the B operator) in the following section when we formalize the second-order task.
This brings us to natural deduction system we shall use to analyse the first-order Sally-Anne task. 8 We use the system for LCD obtained by extending the standard natural deduction system for classical propositional logic with the rules in Figure 1 ; the symbol c is an arbitrary nominal (that is, the name of an arbitrary agent). This is a modified version of Seligman's original natural deduction system for LCD [18] ; these rules here are from Chapter 4 of [5] . We omit the rules for the boolean connectives: they are standard, and we prefer the more perspicuous proof trees obtained by 'compiling down' the simple propositional reasoning involved into additional rules (see the examples in the Appendix). In [5] , this natural deduction system is proved to be sound and complete: Theorem 5.3 Let ψ be a formula and Γ a set of LCD wffs. The first statement below implies the second statement (soundness) and vice versa (completeness).
1. The formula ψ is derivable from Γ in Seligman's natural deduction system.
2. For any model M, any world w, and any assignment g, if, for any formula θ ∈ Γ, it is the case that M, g, w |= θ, then M, g, w |= ψ.
Let's take a closer look. The rules @I and @E in Figure 1 are the introduction and elimination rules for satisfaction operators. The @I rule says that if we have the information c (so we are reasoning about the agent called c) and we also have the information φ, then we can introduce the satisfaction operator @ c and conclude @ c φ, which says that φ holds from c's perspective. The @E rule says: suppose that when reasoning about the agent named c, we also have the information that @ c φ. Then we can eliminate @ c and conclude φ. But it is the Term rule that is central to the formalization. This rule lets us switch to another agent's perspective using hypothetical reasoning: the bracketed expressions [φ 1 ] . . . [φ n ][c] in the statement of the rule are (discharged) assumptions. The key assumption is c, which can be glossed as: let's switch perspective and temporarily adopt c's point of view. 9 The remaining (discharged) assumptions [φ 1 ] . . . [φ n ] in the rule's statement are additional assumptions we may wish to make about the information available from c's perspective. 10 The rule works as follows. Suppose that on the basis of assumptions φ 1 . . . φ n , c we deduce ψ from c's perspective. Then the Term rule tells us that if φ 1 . . . φ n are available in the original perspective, 11 then we can discharge the assumption (which we do by bracketing them, thus obtaining [φ 1 ] . . . [φ n ][c]) and conclude ψ unconditionally in the original perspective.
The Term rule is a subtle and powerful rule. 12 Indeed, as was first shown in [6] , the hybrid logical analysis of the first-order Sally-Anne task boils down to a single application of Term. Recall that Peter is the child performing the task. To answer the question (Where will Sally look for her marble? ) Peter reasons as follows. At the time t 0 , Sally believed the marble to be in the basket. She saw no action to move it, so she still believed this at t 1 . When she returned at t 2 , she still believed the marble to be in the basket (after all, she was out of the room when Anne moved it at time t 1 ). Peter concludes that Sally believes that the marble is still in the basket.
To formalize this we use the nominal s to name Sally, and the modal operators S (sees that) and B (believes that). The predicate l(i, t) means that the marble is at location i at time t. Predicate m(t) means that the marble is moved at time t. We take time to be discrete, and use t + 1 as the successor of t. Using this vocabulary we can express the four belief formation principles we need: 13 (D)
Bm(t) → Sm(t) With the help of these principles, the perspectival reasoning involved in the Sally-Anne task can be formalized as the derivation in Figure 3 (in the Appendix). We have already given Peter's informal perspectival reasoning; the formal proof mirrors it in full detail using a single application of Term in which the assumptions of s model the shift to Sally's perspective. The first two premises @ s Sl(basket, t 0 ) and @ s S¬m(t 0 ) taken together say that Sally at the earlier time t 0 saw that the marble was in the basket and that no action was taken to move it. The third premise, @ s ¬Sm(t 1 ), says that Sally did not see the marble being moved at the time t 1 (since she was absent). Note that when applying the belief formation principles, we simply use them as rules. 14 The bulk of the reasoning on the right-hand-side of the proof tree in Figure 3 simply consists of a sequence of applications of belief formation principles until the crucial formula @ s Bl(basket, t 2 ) -Sally believes the ball is in the basket -is deduced. What turns this into a formalisation of correct reasoning in the Sally-Anne task is the way the sequencing of belief formation principles is perspectivized. The right-hand-side sequencing occurs between the initial assumptions of s (which perspectivizes it as Sally's reasoning) and the final application of Term which lets us conclude 10 The Name rule tells us that if we can prove the information φ by adopting some arbitrary perspective c, then φ also holds from the original perspective. As we won't use this rule in our analysis, we refer to [5] for further discussion.
11 Indicated by the premisses φ 1 . . . φn listed just above the horizontal line in the statement of Term given in Figure 1 . 12 A subtlety worth emphasising is that (as is stated in Figure 1 ) the assumptions [φ 1 ] . . .
[φn] must all be satisfaction statements, otherwise the rule is not sound. We refer the reader to [18] and Chapter 4 of [5] for further discussion. 13 As we mentioned earlier, "belief formation" (and "belief manipulation") is terminology we have borrowed from [19] , and we discuss them in more detail shortly. As for the belief formations principles themselves, we have already met Principle (D) which says if we believe that something is false, then we don't believe it. Principle (P 1) states that a belief in φ may be formed as a result of seeing φ; this is principle (9.2) in [19] , page 251. Principle (P 2) is (pretty clearly) a principle of inertia: a belief that the predicate l is true is preserved from a time t to its successor t + 1, unless it is believed that the marble moved at t. This is essentially Principle (9.11) from [19] , page 253, and axiom [A 5 ] in [1] , page 20. Principle (P 3) encodes the information that seeing the marble being moved is the only way a belief that the marble is being moved can be acquired. Obviously this is not a general truth, but the point of the formalization is simply to capture Peter's reasoning in the Sally-Anne scenario.
14 As we remarked earlier, we do this to 'compile down' the simple propositional reasoning involved. Strictly speaking, deducing Bφ from Sφ requires us to apply the propositional rule of modus ponens to Sφ → Bφ. Using the belief formation principles as additional natural deduction rules enables us to omit such steps and reduce the size of the proof tree. 
· · · ψ (BM) * Bψ * There are no undischarged assumptions in the derivation of ψ except the specified occurrences of φ 1 , . . . , φ n . that the crucial formula is also true from Peter's point of view. In short, the analysis consists of Belief Formation + Perspectival Reasoning correctly combined.
Analagous remarks are made by Stenning and Van Lambalgen about their own analysis of first-order false-belief tasks; see [19] , page 257. They note that the bulk of the reasoning involves belief formation principles and their analysis succeeds because it is carrying out using closed world reasoning; we might summarise their approach as Belief Formation + Closed World Reasoning correctly combined. However they then go on to remark that what they call Belief Manipulation rules (which codify how to reason from one belief state to another) are unnecessary. Now, as far as first-order false-belief reasoning is concerned, we agree completely. Indeed, until now we have provided no proof rules for manipulating the belief operator B beyond the belief formation principles. And that is because, for the first-order Sally-Anne task, we had no need of anything else. But a belief manipulation rule will be needed if we are to extend our perspectival analysis to the second-order Sally-Anne task. 15 We turn to this task now.
Formalizing the second-order Sally-Anne task
As we remarked at the end of Section 4, Anne plays the same role in the second-order Sally-Anne task (namely, reasoning about Sally's belief) that Peter played in the first-order task. This suggests that we should take the proof we have just given (formalizing Peter's reasoning about Sally), view it as formalizing Anne's reasoning about Sally, and nest it (at the appropriate place) inside a formalization of Peter's reasoning about the second-order task. That is, we should add another level of nesting to the perspectival analysis. To make this work we have to introduce a recursive belief manipulation rule for B. We have chosen the rule given in Figure 2 . We call it BM. It is a version of a rule from [10] that fits naturally our tree-style natural deduction proofs. 16 And now to complete the formalization. We shall use the nominal a as a name for Anne, read Dφ as φ is deducible, and make use of a natural deduction formulation of the following belief formation principle:
(P 0) Dφ → Bφ. This says that if we can deduce the information φ then we believe φ (this is principle (9.4) in [19] , page 251). With this machinery in place, the reasoning in the second-order Sally-Anne task can be formalized by the proof tree in Figure 4 in the Appendix. Note that the first-order proof in nested inside: the dots in the upper-right corner of Figure 4 indicate where.
The proof's conclusion, @ a B@ s Bl(basket, t 2 ), says that Anne believes that Sally believes that the marble is in the basket at the time t 2 , and this is indeed the correct response to the second-order task. And Peter can prove this as follows.
The first two premises used in the application of Term with which the proof concludes, @ a S@ s Sl(basket, t 0 ) and @ a S@ s S¬m(t 0 ), say that at time t 0 , Anne saw that Sally saw that the marble was in the basket and that no action was taken to move it. The third premise used in the concluding application of the Term rule, @ a D@ s ¬Sm(t 1 ), says that Anne deduced that Sally did not see the marble being moved at the time t 1 , which is true.
But the essential step is the way the belief manipulation rule BM glues together the two levels of perspectival reasoning. The embedded proof (which reasons from Sally's perspective) yields the conclusion @ s Bl(basket, t 2 ), the correct response to the first-order task. But Peter can't use this information directly: he needs to know that Anne believes this. But the application of BM prefixes the belief operator to form B@ s Bl(basket, t 2 ), and the very next step of the proof shows that this belief holds from Anne's point of view. Thus the reasoning on the right has now been incorporated back into Anne's perspective, and so can be fed into Term, and Peter has his answer.
Concluding discussion
Second-order reasoning is more complex than first-order -the previous section with its embedded proof and use of the BM rule showed this clearly. 17 Nonetheless, our analysis also suggests that the transition to second-order competence marks a more significant development than is suggested by the complexity only position: the full reification of beliefs. Attainment of first-order false-belief competence marks the stage at which the child becomes aware of the fact that beliefs held by other agents can be false; second-order competence, on the other hand, marks the stage where beliefs become objects in their own right that can be manipulated. This shift is mirrored in our analysis: we jumped from a logic that permitted only Belief Formation + Perspectival Reasoning to one that allowed unrestricted Belief Manipulation as well. This is a significant advance. Beliefs are special objects: they are abstract, invisible, and though 'about' the world, they may very well be false. Typically developing children learn this first lesson around the age of four, but there is a further lesson they must learn: that beliefs can be embedded one inside another and freely manipulated. Something like the BM rule seems to be required to capture this step. It is tempting to speculate that at this developmental stage some sort of "recursion module" is adapted to handle these strange new objects, but be that as it may, in typically developing children the reasoning architecture is certainly enriched in an important way at around the age of six. 18 Recursively stacked beliefs lie at the heart of this transition, which brings us to our empirical work [16] . Our logical investigations were carried out as part of an ongoing training study involving Danish speaking children with ASD. Our empirical work is driven by the hypothesis that, in case of children with ASD, improving linguistic recursion competency predicts belief manipulation mastery required by second-order false-belief tasks. We are investigating whether children with ASD use language as a "scaffolding" to support developing understanding of other minds, an explanation advanced in the first-order case by [11] . Table 3 : Zero-order, first-order and second-order information in the tasks Sally-Anne
B mom ¬toy(t 1 ) B mom ¬toy(t 2 ) 18 Second-order B mom B peter toy (t 0 ) B mom B peter toy (t 1 ) B mom B peter toy (t 2 ) 19 B peter B mom toy(t 0 ) B peter B mom ¬toy(t 1 ) B peter B mom ¬toy(t 2 ) 20 Table 4 : The bake-sale task (quoted from [12] , pictures and some questions omitted) Sam and Maria are playing together. They look outside and see that the church is having a bake sale. Maria tells Sam: "I am going to buy chocolate chip cookies for us there," and she walks away.
Mom comes home and she tells Sam that she just drove past the bake sale. "Are they selling chocolate chip cookies?" Sam asks. No, mum says, "they are only selling pumpkin pie." "Maria will now probably get pumpkin pie at the bake sale," Sam says.
Maria has arrived at the bake sale. "I would like to buy chocolate chip cookies," she says. "All we have left are brownies," says the lady behind the stall. Since Maria also likes brownies, she decides to get some brownies.
On her way back, Maria meets the mailman. She tells the mailman: "I have just bought some brownies. I am going to share them with my brother Sam. It is a surprise". "That is nice of you," says the mailman. Then he asks Maria: "Does Sam know what you bought him?"
Ignorance: What does Maria tell the mailman?
Then the mailman asks: "What does Sam think they are selling at the bake sale?"
Second-order false-belief question: What does Maria tell the mailman? S¬m(t 0 ) (P 1)
Bl(basket, t 1 )
[ The vertical dots in the upper-right corner represent the derivation in Figure 3 . So this proof contains two applications of Term: the concluding application, which is shown, and the one inside the earlier proof, which is not. To save space, we have omitted names of the introduction and elimination rules for the @ operator.
